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COLORADO'S AMENDMENT 2 AND
HOMOSEXUALS' RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW
On November 3, 1992, Colorado voters approved Amendment 2
("Amendment 2" or "the amendment"), a referendum amending the
state constitution) This amendment rescinds state and local laws pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and prevents
the enactment of any further legal protections on this basis. 2
 It repeals
Colorado laws and policies, as well as local laws in Denver, Boulder and
Aspen, that prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.' It also makes
it impossible for Colorado citizens to seek legislation, executive policies
or judicial determinations protecting homosexuals from discrimina-
tion in any state or local forum, regardless of the merits of, or need
for, such legislation, policies or determinations. 4
On January 15, 1993, Judge Bayless, of the Colorado District Court,
issued a preliminary injunction preventing the addition of Amend-
ment 2 to the Colorado Constitution. 5
 On July 19, 1993, the Supreme
Louis Sahagyn & Ann Rovin, Colorado;s Gay Rights Ban Stayed, L.A. TrMas, Jan. 15, 1993,
at A4. Amendment 2 was passed by a fifty-three percent vote. Id.
2 Id. Amendment 2 to Article II of the Colorado Constitution provides:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimi-
nation. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Coto. GotoT. art. 11 (as amended by Amendment 2).
3 See Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 19678, at *5 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993)
(Amendment 2 repeals the Colorado Governor's Executive Order of Dec. 10, 1990, prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation, Colorado insurance law banning discrimination in
issuing policies on the basis of sexual orientation (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104(1) (f)(V1II)
(1992)) and laws in three cities), aff'd, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 1993 U.S. LEX1S
6909 (U,S. Nov. 1, 1993) (No. 93-453); Laurie Goodstein, New York Joins Boycott on Colorado Gay
Law, WASH. Pos . '', Dec. 9, 1992, at A3. (Amendment 2 repeals laws in Denver, Boulder and
Aspen). For simplicity's sake, this Note will use the terms homosexual, homosexuality and gay to
refer to homosexual men, lesbians and bisexual men and women.
4 See supra note 2 for the text of Amendment 2.
5 Evans, 1993 WL 19678, at *12 (granting preliminary injunction). Judge Bayless issued the
injunction finding that it was urgently needed, the challengers of Amendment 2 had a reasonable
chance of winning, there was a danger of real, immediate and irreparable injury, there was no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the injunction would not disserve the public interest,
the balance of equities favored the injunction and the injunction would preserve the status quo.
Id. at *3, *12.
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Court of Colorado affirmed this preliminary injunction and on No-
vember 1, 1993, the United States Supreme Court denied Colorado's
petition for certiorari, requesting a review of this preliminary ardent'
On December 14, 1993, the Colorado District Court found the amend-
ment unconstitutional and imposed a permanent injunction.' Colo-
rado's Attorney General has announced that the state will appeal the
ruling to the Colorado Supreme Court, but said that "the court has
already indicated that it would almost certainly strike down" Amend-
ment 2. 8
The outcome of this challenge, which will likely be resolved by the
United States Supreme Court, will have national implications.° If the
courts uphold Amendment 2, many similar measures will likely appear
on state ballots across the country.'° Indeed, while Colorado voters
were deciding the fate of Amendment 2, voters in Oregon considered
a much broader state constitutional amendment limiting homosexual
rights." While the Oregon measure was defeated by a fifty-six percent
6 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272, 1286 (Colo. 1993) (holding that Amendment 2, "to
a reasonable probability, infringes on a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution"), cert. denied, 1993 U.S. Lexis 6909 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1993) (No.
93-453).
7 Evans, 1993 WL 518586, at *12.
5 DirkJohnson, Violation Found on Rights to Equal Protection, N.Y. Ttstrs, Dec. 15, 1993, at
A22.
9 1d. (Gene Nichol, Dean of the University of Colorado Law School says that "KJ or all
practical purposes, it's now going to be up to the United States Supreme Court" to decide the
fate of Amendment 2); David Tuller, New Ballot Measure Proposed For Gay Rights in Colorado, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 26, 1993, at A4 (Evans u Romer is expected to reach the Supreme Court); Supreme
Court Refuses lb Intervene In Colorado Battle. Over Gay Rights, 1993 D.Lit. (BNA) 210, at 03 (Nov.
2, 1993) (Colorado's Deputy Attorney General says United States Supreme Court may decide not
to hear the case until 1995). Amendment 2 may also be attacked at the ballot box. Tuller, supra
at A4. A Colorado lawyer has proposed a ballot initiative which would overturn Amendment '2
and replace it with an amendment banning discrimination against homosexuals in employment,
housing and public accommodations, but also banning "special rights" for gays, such as affirma-
tive action programs. Id.
J° Justin Blum, Anti-Gay Rights Vote Has Unleashed Harassment, Boycott, Gannett News Serv.,
Nov. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMN1 File.
tt Measure No. 9, in VOTERS' PAMPHLET, STATE OF OREGON GENF,RAI. ELECTION NOVEMBER
3, 1992, 93, 93 (1992). Measure No. 9, proposed by initiative at the Oregon general election,
would amend the Oregon Constitution by creating a new section providing:
(1) This state shall not recognize any categorical provision such as "sexual orien-
tation," "sexual preference," and similar phrases that includes homosexuality, pe-
clophilia, sadism or masochism. Quotas, minority status, affirmative action, or any
similar concepts, shall not apply to these forms of conduct, nor shall government
proniote these behaviors.
(2) State, regional and local governments and their properties and monies shall
not be used to promote, encourage, or facilitate homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism
or masochism.
(3) State, regional and local governments and their departments, agencies and
other entities, including specifically the State Department of Higher Education and
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vote, its sponsors, heartened by the success of Amendment 2, have
announced plans to put a toned-down version on the ballot in 1994. 12
To date, groups in over a dozen states are planning ballot measures to
pass amendments similar to Colorado's Amendment 2.' 3 Additionally,
the outcome of this challenge will also influence other gay rights issues
across the country."
This Note argues that Amendment 2 violates the United States
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection
of the laws.'' Section I sets out modern equal protection law, discussing
the different levels of judicial review, the requirement of state action
and the treatment of acts that limit political power. 16 Section II dis-
cusses equal protection treatment of homosexual classifications. 17 Sec-
tion III discusses the nature and causes of homosexuality and society's
treatment of hornosexuals.' 8 Section IV argues that laws that use ho-
mosexuality as a classification deserve heightened judicial scrutiny.m
Finally, section V argues that Amendment 2 is discriminatory state
action that violates the Equal Protection Clause. 2°
I. MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny
the public schools, shall assist in setting a standard for Oregon's youth that recog-
nizes homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism and masochism as abnormal, wrong, un-
natural, and perverse and that these behaviors are to be discouraged and avoided,
(4) It. shall be considered that it is the intent of the people in enacting this section
that if any part thereof is held unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall be held
in force.
Id.
t2 Valerie Richardson, Anti-Gay Forces in Oregon Undeterred After Defeat, WASII. Timm, Jan. 4,
1993, at A6.
13Johnson, supra note 8, at A21 ("[a]dvocates for gay rights say efforts are under way in 14
states to put a measure similar to Colorado's on the ballot this year"); Brad Knickerbocker, Gay
Rights May Be Social Issue of 1990s, CHRIS. Sct. Mont., Feb. II, 1993, at I (fund-raising and
signature-gathering activities taking place in California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oregon and Washington); see also Lisa Keen, Referendums
and Rights; Across the Country, Battles Over Protection for Gays and Lesbians, WASII. POST, Oct. 31,
1993, at C3 (referendums will be on ballots in eight states in 1994).
11 See Sue Anne Pressley, Heating Opens On Challenge To Colorado Gay Rights Ban; Thal May
Become Forum On Status Of U.S. Homosexuals, WASH. POST, Oct. 13,1993, at A2.
15 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Amendment 2 may also violate other constitutional provi-
sions that are beyond the scope of this Note.
36 See infra notes 21-165 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 166-208 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 209-98 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 299-344 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 345-66 and accompanying text.
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to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 2 '
This clause does not deny states the ability to classify a group of people
and treat them differently from the rest of the population. 22 Rather, it
denies states the power to accord differential treatment on the basis
of classifications that are unrelated to the promotion of a legitimate
state interest." To be valid, a classification must be reasonable and
must have a fair and substantial relation to the state's objective, so that
persons similarly situated are treated alike. 24 In determining whether
an action violates the Equal Protection Clause, courts apply different
levels of scrutiny depending upon the nature of the action involved
and the classification it draws. 25 Equal protection analysis thus involves
two steps." First, the court must determine whether the action deserves
heightened judicial scrutiny. 27 Second, the court must determine
whether, under the applicable standard of review, the law deprives a
class of persons of equal protection of the law." This section discusses
modern equal protection law. Part A reviews the basic levels of judicial
scrutiny used in equal protection cases." Part B discusses the types of
discriminatory behavior that are considered state action and therefore
fall within the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. 3° Finally, part C
analyzes equal protection law where state action decreases a class'
political power."
A. The Standards of Equal Protection Review
The modern, multi-tiered approach to equal protection review,
under which courts apply different levels of judicial scrutiny to differ-
ent types of actions, was first suggested by the United States Supreme
21 U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection claims brought strider the Fifth Amend.
ment are treated identically to those brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and will there-
fore not be distinguished in this Note. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2
(1975)). As this Note addresses a state measure, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause provides the appropriate remedy.
22 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
23 Id. at 75-76 (holding that a state could not give men preference over women in choosing
an estate's administrator).
24 Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
25 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
2° See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (attacking Texas
system of financing public education).
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See infra notes 32-89 and accompanying text.
3° See infra notes 90-128 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 129-65 and accompanying text.
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Court in a footnote in the 1938 case of United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts. 32
 In this case, the Court held that a law that prohibited the
interstate shipment of filled milk did not violate equal protection,"
The Court reasoned that legislation affecting commercial transactions
is assumed to be constitutional unless it has no rational basis." In
footnote four of its opinion, the Court suggested that some legislation
may be subject to a greater degree of judicial review. 35
 Although this
footnote was only dictum mentioning the possibility of more rigorous
judicial review, it has become the paradigm for heightened equal
protection scrutiny of laws involving certain groups and fundamental
righ ts."
Footnote four suggested two situations where heightened judi-
cial scrutiny may be appropriate. 37
 It implied that state action which
amounts to "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities," such as
racial, religious or national minorities, may demand more searching
judicial inquiry." It also implied that legislation which interferes with
the political process may be subject to heightened scrutiny." For ex-
ample, the Court suggested that interferences with the right to vote,
disseminate information or organize for political purposes might call
for heightened judicial review. 40
 In suggesting this, the Court reasoned
that such interference must be closely scrutinized, because it can
hinder the political process ordinarily utilized to effectuate the repeal
of undesirable legislation. 4 ' Footnote four led to the development of a
two-tiered system of equal protection review, composed of a "rational
basis" test for economic and social regulations and a "strict scrutiny"
test for "suspect" classifications and limitations of certain fundamental
rights. 42
 A third, intermediate standard of review was eventually added
as another tier. 43
22 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938); see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
214 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
as Carotene Prod., 304 U.S. at 148.
34 1d. at 152.
35 See id. at 152 n,4.
36 See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 32, at 214-15.
37 See Carotene Prod., 304 U.S, at 152 n.4.
35 Id. at 153 n,4.
" Id. at 152 n,4; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA, .supra note 32, at 214.
44) Carotene Prod., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 32, at 214.
41 Carotene Prod., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 32, at 214.
42 See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 32, at 214-15.
43 Id. at 215. In a dissenting opinion to the 1970 case of Dandridge v. Williams, Justice
Thurgood Marshall suggested replacing this multi-tiered approach with a "sliding-scale" ap-
proach. 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970). Under this approach, instead of pigeon-holing a classifica-
tion into a level of scrutiny, courts would weigh the character of the classification, the relative
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Most equal protection challenges fall within the rational basis test,
wherein courts will presume an action to be valid and sustain it if the
classification it draws is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."
This interest can be the stated purpose of the act, but need not be."
In fact, courts have even provided hypothetical interests to justify the
disparate treatment when the state has not given any." Almost every
case that has used this standard has upheld the challenged action. 47
The United States Supreme Court, however, has struck down laws
under this standard when they are based on illegitimate objectives,
such as "a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.""
For example, in 1985, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
the United States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional for a city to
require a special permit for a group home for the mentally retarded
but not for similar housing units for the non-retarded." The Court
applied the rational basis standard of review, noting that classifications
that are based on mental retardation may be justifiable due to the
reduced abilities and special needs of the members of this class." The
Court stated that the only basis for the classification was prejudice
against retarded persons. 5 ' The Court found this did not justify the
state's law, as negative attitudes and fear are not permissible bases for
treating one class of persons differently from others." Therefore, the
Court held that because there was no legitimate state purpose, the law
violated the Equal Protection Clause."
importance to individuals in the class of the governmental benefits they are denied and the
asserted state interest in supporting the classification. Id. This approach has not been adopted.
44 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
45 See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178-79 (1980) ("fw]here
there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end"); United States Dep't
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
46 See, e.g., Fritz, 449 U.S. at 178-79 (upholding retirement system's different treatment of
different classes on the basis of a hypothetical state purpose); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955) (upholding statute making it unlawful for anyone other than a licensed
opthamologist or optometrist to fit eyeglass lenses on the basis of hypothetical state purposes).
41 See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 636, 643 (1986) (upholding distinction between
households of closely related persons and those composed of others for food stamp eligibility);
Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348 (1986) (upholding provision of Social Security Act awarding
payment of survivor's benefits to a widow's spouse who remained single after age 60, but not a
similarly situated divorced widowed spouse). This standard of review has been so deferential that
scholars have criticized it as being a mere "rubber-stamp review." Harris M. Miller II, Note, An
Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on
Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 808 (1984).
48 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
49 1d. at 450.
59 M. at 442.
91 Id. at 450.
52 Id. at 448.
58 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
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Similarly, in 1973, in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, the United States Supreme Court held that a law that had the
intent and effect of discriminating against hippies violated the Equal
Protection Clause." Moreno addressed a provision of the Food Stamp
Act of 1964, which excluded from participation in the food stamp
program any household containing unrelated persons. 55 The Court
applied the rational basis equal protection analysis, stating that to be
valid, the classification must rationally relate to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. 56 The Court reasoned that the classification was not
related to the stated purpose of the act, minimizing fraud, or to any
other legitimate governmental goal." According to the Court, the
purpose of the act was to keep hippies and "hippie communities" out
of the food stamp program? It reasoned that this objective could not
support the law, because the desire to harm an unpopular group is not
a legitimate governmental purpose." Hence, the Court concluded that
there was no rational basis for the classification, and it therefore vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. 6°
Courts will apply the more rigorous strict scrutiny standard of
review when the classification in question is considered "suspect." 6 t
Under this standard, courts will only uphold a classification if it is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest."' Courts apply this
level of scrutiny to classifications based on race, national origin and
sometimes alienage. 63 They use this higher standard of review because
these classifications are rarely relevant to the achievement of a legiti-
mate state interest."4 Courts generally consider four elements in deter-
mining whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate for a given clas-
sification: (1) whether the class is defined by a trait that frequently
bears no relationship to the ability to perform in or contribute to
54 413 U.S. at 538.
55 /d. at 529.
56 1d, at 533.
57 Id. at 537-38.
58 Id. at 534.
"Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
"Id, at 538.
fit See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
62 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (racial
classifications must be struck down unless "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective").
63 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (aliens
are usually a class deserving heightened judicial review); Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (racial classifica-
tions are suspect and subject to the "most rigid scrutiny"); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964) (same). But see Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 442 (1982) (applying interme-
diate scrutiny to aliens),
64 See Cleburne, 473 U.S, at 440,
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society; (2) whether the class has been saddled with unique disabilities
because of prejudice or inaccurate stereotypes; (3) whether the trait
defining the class is immutable; and (4) whether the class is a politically
powerless minority." No one factor is determinative." For example, the
Supreme Court has indicated that immutability is not a necessary
element for suspect class status. 67 Taken together, however, these ele-
ments establish whether a classification is suspect and therefore subject
to the application of strict judicial scrutiny. 68
With the exception of immutability, courts accord these elements
their plain meanings. 68 The immutability element, however, does not
mean literal immutability—the physical inability to change or mask the
trait. 7° For example, aliens can become naturalized, African-Americans
can sometimes hide their race and immigrants can often hide their
national origin, yet these are all immutable suspect classifications." All
that is needed to satisfy the immutability element is that changing the
trait that defines the class would involve great difficulties, such as a
major physical change or a traumatic change of identity. 72 Along the
same lines, traits are considered immutable if they are "so central to a
person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penal-
ize a person for refusing to change them." 73
65 See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)
(applying heightened scrutiny to a Texas statute withholding state funds to schools where chil-
dren are not "legally admitted" into the United States); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
684, 686 (1973) (applying heightened scrutiny for women); Miller, supra note 47, at 812.
66 See Miller, supra note 47, at 812 (neither immutability, unique disabilities based on stereo-
types, a history of discrimination nor political powerlessness alone indicates whether a particular
classification should receive heightened scrutiny); see also Cleburne, 475 U.S. at 440-41 (listing
the characteristics of a suspect class without mentioning immutability); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (same); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ro-
driguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (same); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
909 F.2d 375, 376-77 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (immutability of trait not a requisite
for suspect class).
67 Cleburne, 475 U.S. at 442 n.10, 440-41; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
69 See Miller, supra note 47, at 812 (factors taken together help determine whether a clas-
sification needs special protection); Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the
Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773, 801-03 (1988) (discussing designation of
homosexuals as a suspect class).
69 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (applying ability to perform in society to gender); Miller,
supra note 47, at 814-16 (discussing stereotypes, discrimination and the politically powerless).
70 See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Miller, supra note 47, at 813.
71 See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring).
72 See id. (Norris, J., concurring).
"Id. (Norris, J., concurring).
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Strict judicial scrutiny is also applied, regardless of the classifica-
tion drawn, when "fundamental" rights and liberties are threatened by
the state action at issue. 74
 Thus, when an act threatens the proper
functioning of our representative government, this higher level of
review is used." For this reason, in the 1969 case of Kramer v. Union
Free School District, the United States Supreme Court held that a limi-
tation on the right to vote must be closely scrutinized." The Court
examined a New York law that restricted the electorate in school
district elections to property owners and parents of schoolchildren in
the district." The Court reasoned that the rational basis test rests on
the assumption that government institutions are structured to fairly
represent the people and therefore deserve great deference." The
Court stated that when, as in this case, the challenge to the action is a
challenge to this assumption, the assumption can no longer justify this
deferential level of review." The Court held that such actions must
therefore meet the more rigorous test of being necessary to promote
a compelling state interest. 8"
Similarly, in the 1966 case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
the Supreme Court held that a poll tax must be strictly scrutinized.'"
Harper addressed a Virginia poll tax of $1.50 imposed on all voters."
The Court reasoned that the tax discriminated against the poor in the
fundamental right of suffrage." The Court closely scrutinized the law
and found it violative of the Equal Protection Clause." Similarly, the
Court has applied strict scrutiny in striking down unreasonable voter
residency requirements. 85
A third and final level of judicial scrutiny applies to laws that rely
on "quasi-suspect" classifications. 88
 This level of review falls in between
74
 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
m See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
70 ld. at 626.
"Id. at 622.
78
 Id. at 628.
73 Id.
88 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626-27.
81
 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
82 Id. at 668.
83 Id. at 666-67.
84
 Id. at 670.
Dunn V. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 345 (1972) (one-year residency requirement invalid
as not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest).
85 See Miller, supra note 47, at 811; see also, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (heightened scrutiny for classifications based on gender); Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982) (heightened scrutiny for classifications based on illegitimacy).
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strict scrutiny and rational basis. 87 It requires that the classification be
"substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental inter-
est."88 Courts generally reserve this level of scrutiny for classifications
based on gender, illegitimacy and sometimes alienage."
B. State Action
The Fourteenth Amendment only applies to acts that can be fairly
attributed to the state." Hence, the Equal Protection Clause provides
no remedy for private discriminatory conduct, regardless of its sever-
ity. 9 ' When it is not clear whether the state should be considered an
actor, courts follow a few principles set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in the following cases 9 2
As the Supreme Court held in the 1989 case of DeShaney v. Win-
nebago County Department of Social Services, a state's failure to protect
against private conduct is not state action." In DeShaney, a child was
beaten and permanently injured by his father." The child's guardian
ad litem sued city social workers because they received complaints and
had reason to believe that the father was beating the child, but did not
act to remove him from his father's custody.95 The Court reasoned that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer a right to governmental
aid, even when such aid is necessary to secure interests of which the
government itself may not deprive an individual." The Court stated
that the state had no duty to protect the child because, although it may
have been aware of the dangers, it played no part in their creation and
87 See Miller, supra note 47, at 811.
88 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); see also Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 192, 204 (1976) (no valid purpose in prohibiting sale of beer to males under the
age of twenty-one but allowing its purchase by females over the age of eighteen).
" See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (gender); Mills, 456 U.S. at 99 (illegitimacy); Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 442 (1982) (alienage); Boren, 429 U.S. at 204 (gender); see also Miller, supra
note 47, at 811.
9° E.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. 922, 924-25, 937 (1982) (state officers acting jointly
with private party in securing privately disputed property was state action); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 347, 351 (1974) (termination of service by a heavily regulated utility with
a partial monopoly was not state action).
91 See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
92 See infra notes 93-122 and accompanying text for a discussion of factors used to determine
whether an action can be attributed to the state,
93 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989), Although this was a due process case, its state action analysis is
analogous to that of equal protection, as they both rely on the applicability of the first clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
94 Id. at 191.
95 Id.
96 1d. at 196.
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did nothing that rendered the child more vulnerable to them.97 The
Court also noted that the fact that the state once took temporary
custody of the child did not mean that it had a duty to protect him."
According to the Court, a state need not protect an individual's safety
simply because it has done so in the past." The Court therefore con-
cluded that a state's failure to protect a person against private conduct
did not constitute state action.'"
Similarly, in 1977, in Maher v. Roe, the United States Supreme
Court held that the government does not have to fund an activity
simply because it has a constitutional duty not to interfere with it.'°'
Despite the fact that states cannot interfere with a woman's right to
have an abortion, the Court permitted a state to disallow Medicaid
funding for abortions, even though the state funded other forms of
pregnancy care.'" The Court reasoned that failure to fund or support
does not create a barrier to a right, but merely leaves individuals in
the position they would be in if the government did not address the
issue at all. 10" Hence, the Court held that the government has no duty
to support or finance an activity simply because it has a constitutional
duty not to interfere with it. 10 '
On the other hand, as the United States Supreme Court held in
the 1961 case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, private con-
duct can be imputed to the state if the state is sufficiently entangled
in the activity.'" In Burton, the Court addressed racial discrimination
in a private restaurant which occupied leased space in a public garage
building,'" The Court stated that the lease relationship placed the state
in a position of interdependence with the restaurant and therefore
made it a participant in the discrimination. 117 The Court held that the
private conduct of the restaurant was attributable to the state, and was
therefore within the scope of the Equal Protection Clause.'"
97 1d. at 201.
98 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
" Id.
i" Id. at 197.
101 432 US. 464, 470 (1977).
102 Id. at 464, 470; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991) (federal government
not obligated to fund abortions at family-planning clinics).
105 Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
DM Id. at 470; see also Rust, II 1 S. CL at 1776.
106 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
1 °6 1d. at 716, 719-20 (restaurant refused to serve blacks).
197 Id. at 725.
1°81d.
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Additionally, state encouragement of private action can bring that
action within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 o9 For example,
in the 1964 case of Robinson v. Florida, the United States Supreme
Court held that, when encouraged by an otherwise valid state regula-
tion, private discrimination can be attributed to the state." ) In Robin-
son, the Court said that the private discrimination of a restaurant in
not serving Negroes could be attributed to the state due to a state
health regulation requiring separate lavatories for each race."' Al-
though the Court did not find the regulation invalid in itself, it rea-
soned that the regulation encouraged private discrimination to a de-
gree sufficient to support a finding of state action."' Therefore, the
Court held the private policy of the restaurant to be state action." 3
Similarly, in the 1953 case of Barrows v. Jackson, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state court's awarding of damages for
breaches of discriminatory covenants makes such covenants state ac-
tion."' The lawsuit in Barrows was brought between the parties to a
covenant forbidding the use of real estate by non-whites."' The Court
reasoned that awarding damages for breaching such covenants en-
courages their making."' The Court therefore concluded that the
covenants constituted state action that violated the Equal Protection
Clause.''''
In fact, words alone can be sufficient encouragement to implicate
the state in the resulting action."' For example, in the 1963 case of
Lombard v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court held that due
to their coercive effect, non-binding proclamations by government
officials constituted state action." 9 In Lombard, the Court addressed
announcements by a city's mayor and superintendent of police that
"sit-in" demonstrations of restaurants that segregated or refused to
109 See, e.g., Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964) (state law encouraged discrimina-
tion by private restaurants); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 270-71, 273 (1963) (proclama-
tions by government officials coerced discrimination); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254
(1953) (awarding damages for breach of private discriminatory covenants encouraged such
covenants).
110 378 U.S. at 156-57.
'" Id.
H2 1d.
I" Id.
"4 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953).
"5 Id. at 251-52.
116 /d. at 254.
"7 1d.
118 Lombard, 383 U.S. at 270-71, 273.
19 1d. at 273.
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serve blacks would not be permitted. 120
 The Court reasoned that, despite
the fact that they were not supported by law, the announcements had
great coercive effect in promoting continued segregation.' 2 ' The Court
recognized the effect of the "voice of the state" on private actions and
imputed the segregation encouraged by the announcements to the
state.' 22
Finally, it is worth noting that, although private biases are not
within the realm of the Equal Protection Clause, the clause does pre-
vent the state from acting upon them.' 2' Accordingly, in the 1984 case
Palmore v. Sidoti, the United States Supreme Court held that the Con-
stitution prohibits states from giving private biases effect.' 24 The Pal-
more Court addressed a ruling affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court
that removed a child from the custody of a white divorcee because she
was marrying a black man. 125
 The state of Florida took the child out of
the mother's custody due to the social "pressures" the child would face
as a result of living in an interracial household.' 2° The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that private biases and the possible
injury resulting therefrom were not permissible considerations on
which the state should act. 127
 The Court reasoned that, although the
Constitution cannot prevent such private prejudices, it cannot tolerate
them either. 128
C. Equal Protection of Political Power
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits state actions that reduce
the power of a class, either by making the classification a factor in
politics or by making it harder for the class to seek government ac-
tion. 129
 For this reason, the Supreme Court has held it violative of the
Equal Protection Clause to disadvantage a minority group at the
12° Id. at 270-71.
121 Id. at 273.
122 1d. at 274.
125 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 430-31.
126 1d. at 431.
127 1d. at 433.
128 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
129
 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387, 393 (1969) (city charter making it harder to
pass ordinances dealing with racial discrimination in housing); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
371, 381 (1967) (state constitutional amendment prohibiting laws against housing discrimina-
tion); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401, 404 (1964) (requiring candidates' race to be printed
on ballots).
234	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:221
polls.'" In the 1964 case of Anderson v. Martin, the United States
Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to require a candidate's race
to be printed on election ballots.' 3 ' In Anderson, African-Americans
who sought election to a school board challenged a statute that re-
quired the race of all candidates to be printed on the ballots.' 32 The
Court examined the law in light of attitudes toward and pressures on
blacks at the time and found that it would have a repressive effect.'"
The Court reasoned that the law was a vehicle for prejudice that could
influence elections along racial lines and therefore held it to be inva-
lid.' 34
The Court has also invalidated laws that make it harder for a
minority group to redress grievances than it is for people outside of
the group.'" In the 1967 case of Reitman v. Mulkey, the United States
Supreme Court held it violative of the Equal Protection Clause for a
state constitution to allow full discretion in real estate transactions.'"
In Reitman, the Court addressed an amendment to the California
Constitution providing that any person could decline to sell, lease or
rent private real property with complete discretion.' 37 This amendment
was passed by popular referendum.'" A couple brought suit on the
basis of a landlord's refusal to rent an apartment to them because of
their race.'" The California Supreme Court stated that the intent of
the amendment was to overturn state laws that prevented discrimina-
tion in real estate transactions and to prevent any future laws or other
state action to the same end. 14° Because the amendment established a
right to discriminate in the state constitution, the United States Su-
preme Court agreed with the California court that the law had the
effect of encouraging and authorizing discrimination."' The Court
' 5° Anderson, 375 U.S. at 403, 404.
131 Id. at 404.
"2 Id. at 401.
133 Id. at 403.
134 /d. at 402.
135 See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376.
136 387 U.S. at 371, 376.
137 /d. at 371. The provision, submitted as proposition 14 in the 1964 election, provided:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease
or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such
property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Id. at 370-71 (quoting CAL. COA'S'T. art. I, § 26).
133 Id. at 371.
13g/d. at 372.
14°1d. at 374.
141 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374-76.
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reasoned that the amendment did much more than repeal existing
anti-discrimination laws; it embodied the right to discriminate "in the
State's basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial
regulation at any level of the state government." 142
 According to the
Court, the amendment had the effect of allowing those who wanted to
discriminate to do so free from any official interference.'" The Court
held that the measure significantly involved the state in private dis-
crimination and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 44
Two years after Reitman, the Court came to a similar result in
addressing another measure that made it more difficult for a minority
group to seek political redress.'" In 1969, in Hunter v. Erickson, the
United States Supreme Court held that an amendment to a city charter
that made it harder to pass anti-discrimination laws violated the Equal
Protection Clause.'" Hunter involved an amendment to the Akron,
Ohio, charter which prevented the city council from implementing any
ordinance dealing with racial, religious or ancestral discrimination in
housing without the approval of a majority of the city's voters. 147 An
African-American who was not shown houses by a real estate agent be-
cause the owners did not wish their houses shown to Negroes brought
suit.'" This amendment, like that in Reitman, was passed by a majority
referendum vote. 14 3`
 Also like the amendment in Reitman, the Hunter
amendment had the effect of both repealing current anti-discrimina-
tion laws and requiring a majority plebiscite vote to pass new ones.''"
The Court reasoned that the amendment drew a distinction between
groups seeking protection against discrimination in property dealings
and those who sought to regulate such dealings for other reasons.''' It
142 Id. at 377.
143 /d.
144 1d. at 381.
145 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,393 (1969).
' 46 1d. at 386.
147 1d. at 386-87. Akron City Charter § 137 provided:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the
use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of
real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the
electors voting on the question at a regular or general election before said ordi-
nance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the adoption
of this section shall cease to he effective until approved by the electors as provided
herein.
Id. at 387.
t48
149 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 370-71.
I" Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 371.
151 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390.
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stated that the amendment affected racial minorities and placed spe-
cial burdens on them within the governmental process.' 52 The Court
reasoned that this was no more permissible than denying minorities
the right to vote.' 53
The Hunter Court used the strict scrutiny standard, because the
case involved racial discrimination, and found that the amendment was
not valid. 154 It reasoned that, although a state may distribute legislative
power as it desires and the people may retain power over certain
subjects, a legislative structure that disregards the limits of the Four-
teenth Amendment is invalid.'" The fact that the measure was imple-
mented through a popular referendum did not immunize it from the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.'" Hence, the Court held
that a state cannot disadvantage a group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation on its behalf than for other groups, and the Court
therefore invalidated the measure as a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.' 57
In sum, the Equal Protection Clause forbids states from treating
a class of people differently from others, unless the classification is
reasonably related to a legitimate state objective.' 58 In making this
determination, courts apply different levels of scrutiny.'" Most chal-
lenges will only face rational basis review, whereby the court will uphold
the action if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' 60 When
the classification is considered "suspect" or involves a fundamental
right, however, courts will apply a strict scrutiny standard of review, and
the action will only be upheld if the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest's'' Courts will also occasionally apply
an intermediate level of scrutiny when the classification is "quasi-sus-
pect. "162 The Equal Protection Clause only applies to actions that can
be fairly attributed to the state.'" State encouragement of private
' 52 1d. at 391.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 392.
155 Id.; see also Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964)
(la] citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the
people chose that it be").
156 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392.
157 Id. at 393.
158 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
159 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
16° See id. at 440.
161 See id.
162 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
163 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil, 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
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actions can bring them within the scope of this clause.'" Furthermore,
state actions that reduce the political power of a class deny the class
equal protection of the laws and are therefore unconstitutional.'"
H, EQUAL PROTECTION TREATMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue
of whether homosexuals are a suspect class deserving strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. 166 Although some commentators
suggest that they are, several lower courts have held that they are not,'"
These courts apply the rational basis test and usually find such a basis
to justify the act in question.'" Many of these cases, however, deal with
a unique governmental need to justify the classification in the particu-
lar situation.'" For example, courts have upheld the military's ban on
homosexuals due to the unique governmental interest in maintaining
the discipline and morale of the armed forces.'"
In reaching the conclusion that homosexual classifications do not
deserve strict equal protection scrutiny, many courts rely on the United
States Supreme Court's 1986 landmark decision of Bowers v. Hard-
wick'" In Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the due process right
1" See, e.g., Robinson V. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267, 273 (1963); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953).
165
 See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967); Anderson v.
Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 404 (1964).
See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir.
1990) (Supreme Court never subjected homosexual classifications to heightened review).
"7 See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1616 (2d ed. 1988)
(homosexuals should be deemed a suspect class); High 'Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571 (rational basis
review is proper for examination of denial of security clearances due to homosexuality); Ben-Sha-
lom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (rational basis review proper fbr examination of
discharge from Army due to homosexuality), cert. denied sub nom., Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (same for discharge
from Navy), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padilla v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (same level of review for refusal to employ homosexual as FBI agent); Baker v. Wade, 769
F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding Texas statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with
another individual of the same sex), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
1" E.g., Ben -Shalom, 881 F.2d at 465 (rational basis exists for dismissing soldier from army
due to homosexuality); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) (same).
"See, e.g., Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 465 (Army); Rich, 735 F.2(1 at 1229 (same).
170 881 F.2d at 465; Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229. In Rich, the court said that the special
government interest was so compelling that the dismissal of a soldier from the army due to
homosexuality would even withstand strict scrutiny review. 735 F.2d at 1229. The constitutionality
of banning homosexuals from military service is once again being reviewed due to the recent
public debate over and change in the military's policy on homosexuals. See supra notes 291-98.
171 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571 (referring to Hardwick);
Ben-Shalom, 881 1?2d at 464 (same); Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1075 (same); Padula, 822 F.2d at 103
(same).
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to privacy does not include a fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy. 172 The defendant in Hardwick was charged with violat-
ing a Georgia statute by committing sodomy with another male in the
privacy of his bedroom.' 78 The Court refused to expand the reach of
the Due Process Clause by adding a new fundamental right and found
that even if the law was based purely on morality, that was an adequate
rationale to support it. 174 Hence, the Court held that the criminaliza-
tion of homosexual sodomy did not violate due process. 175
The Hardwick decision only dealt with the issue of whether there
is a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 176 It only
addressed sodomy, an act; it did not address any issues relating to
homosexuality itself, a status."7 It also did not address the issue of
whether it is constitutional to criminalize heterosexual sodomy or the
issue of equal protection."8 Nonetheless, courts have held that Hard-
wick dictates that homosexuals, as a class, are not entitled to height-
ened equal protection scrutiny. 179 Although these courts recognize that
Hardwick did not address equal protection, they state that its reasoning
leads to the conclusion that homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect
class.'g"
172 478 U.S. at 190-91. Interestingly, Hardwick was almost decided the other way. See Linda
Greenhouse, When Second Thoughts Come Too Late, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1990, at A14. The case
was decided 5-4, with Justice Powell casting the deciding vote. Id. In a 1990 interview, Justice
Powell said that he "probably made a mistake" in voting with the majority. Id. This does not,
however, mean that the decision will probably be overturned, as it appears that justices who joined
the court after the decision, such as Justices Scalia and Kennedy, would probably have voted with
the majority. See id.
' 79 478 U.S. at 187-88; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1992). The law made it a crime to commit
sodomy by performing or submitting to "ally sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1992).
174 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195, 196. The Court said that "the law ... is constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Id. at 196. Chief Justice
Burger, in a concurring opinion, further emphasized the moral basis of such laws, saying that
"No hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching." Id. at 197 (Burger, Cj., concurring).
175 id, at 196.
176 Id. at 190.
177 See id.
178 Id. at 188 n.2 (although the statute at issue applied to heterosexual as well as homosexual
sodomy, the court expressly stated that it expressed "no opinion on the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy"); id. at 196 n.8 (case does not address equal
protection).
172 See supra, note 171 and accompanying text; see also Rhonda R. Rivera, Sexual Orientation
and The Law, to HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 81, 84 (John C.
Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991).
18° See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th
Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.,
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For example, in 1987, in Padula v. Webster, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that homosex-
uals do not constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes.'"
Padula addressed equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.'" In
Padula, an applicant for a position as a special agent with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation brought suit claiming that she was denied
employment because of her homosexuality.'" The Padula court rea-
soned that, although Hardwick did not address the issue of equal
protection, its reasoning foreclosed homosexuals from gaining suspect
class status. 184 The court said that it would be anomalous to give strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to a group defined by
conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize.'" The court ex-
plained that it is unjustifiable to discriminate invidiously against a
suspect class. 186 After Hardwick, however, states can validly discriminate
against homosexuals by making the conduct that defines them crimi-
nal.'" The court therefore concluded that, in order to be logically
consistent with Hardwick, homosexuals cannot be afforded suspect or
quasi-suspect class status for equal protection purposes.'"
The opposite position was set forth by Judge William A. Norris, of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a concur-
ring opinion to the 1989 case of Watkins v. United States Army.'" This
position is that the Supreme Court's holding in Hardwick is not rele-
vant to the appropriate degree of equal protection scrutiny for
classifications based on homosexuality.' 90 The lawsuit in Watkins was
brought by a soldier who was denied reenlistment in the army due to
his homosexuality.' 91
 Although the case was decided on other grounds,
Judge Norris set out his position on the equal protection issue in a
Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1075 (Fed.
Or. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
181 822 F.2d at 103.
162 Id. at 101. This is not an important distinction, however, as courts afford the same
treatment to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims as they do to equal protection claims
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id, at 101 11.5.
no Id. at 98.
184 1d. at 103,
185
 Padula, 822 F.2d at 103.
186 Id.
' 87 Id.
188 See id. at 103-04.
189 875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
957 (1990).
180 1d. (Norris, J., concurring).
191 Id. at 701.
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concurring opinion.'" Judge Norris stated that, as it only held that the
Due Process Clause provided no substantive privacy protections for acts
of homosexual sodomy, Hardwick did not suggest that states may pe-
nalize homosexuals for their sexual orientation.'" He pointed out that
Hardwick dealt with homosexual conduct, not orientation, and was
decided on due process, not equal protection grounds.' 94 He also
pointed out that the motivation behind the Court's decision in Hard-
wick was its concern with the expansion of fundamental due process
rights, not an antipathy toward homosexuals: 95
Judge Norris refuted the "anomaly" argument set forth in Padula,
explaining that the equal protection inquiry is fundamentally different
from the due process inquiry: 96 He explained that the latter protects
policies that are "deeply rooted in th [e] Nation's history and tradi-
tion," while the former "protects minorities from discriminatory treat-
ment at the hands of the majority."'" Hence, Norris explained, Hard-
wick merely decided that homosexual sodomy is not so "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition" that it should fall within the zone
of personal privacy protected by the Due Process Clause.'" He ex-
plained that there was no anomaly in applying strict scrutiny to clas-
sifications based on homosexuality because the reason that homosexu-
ality is not considered a deeply-rooted part of our tradition, and
therefore not a fundamental right, is that homosexuals have been
subjected to a long history of invidious discrimination. 199 Thus, he
stated that the very reason why there is no due process right to engage
in homosexual conduct supports the conclusion that homosexuals
deserve suspect class status.'" This view is supported by the fact that
these constitutional guarantees operate in entirely different dimen-
sions: due process deals with basic individual rights and equal protec-
tion addresses broadly defined classifications."' Judge Norris con-
cluded that, because the question of whether homosexual conduct is
192 Id. at 711, 716-31 (Norris, J., concurring). The court relied on common law estoppel
grounds to hold that the army could not deny reenlistment; it did not address the issue of equal
protection. See id. at 711.
193 Id. at 716 (Norris, J., concurring).
194 Watkins, 875 F,2d at 716-17 (Norris, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 720 (Norris, J., concurring).
196 Id. at 718 (Norris, J., concurring).
197 Id. (Norris,.I., concurring).
198 Id. at 718-19 (Norris, J., concurring).
193 Watkins, 875 F.2d at 719 (Norris, J., concurring).
200 Id.
201 See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1161, 1166, 1168 (1988).
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protected by the Due Process Clause is a different question from what
level of scrutiny should apply to homosexuals under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, Hardwick did not preclude the application of strict scrutiny
to homosexuals as a class. 2"2
Norris' view is supported by the United States Supreme Court's
distinction between laws addressing acts and laws addressing status. 203
In the 1962 case of Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court held that
while a state can criminalize drug use (an act), it cannot criminalize
drug addiction (a status) . 204 The Court examined a California statute
that made it a criminal offense for a person to "be addicted to the use
of narcotics."203 The statute made the status of narcotics addiction an
offense for which people could be convicted at any time before they re-
formed, even if they never used or possessed narcotics in the state.206
The Court distinguished acts from status and held that while the
former can be criminalized, the latter cannot. 207 The Court invalidated
the statute as an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 208
Hi. HOMOSEXUALITY
A. The Nature Of Homosexuality
Although there are many definitions of homosexuality, the most
common is an erotic or affectional disposition toward members of the
same sex. 2"9 This definition is misleading because most people experi-
ence some degree of homosexual feelings at some point in their lives. 21 "
In fact, such feelings are so common among children that some author-
ities regard a homosexual phase as a normal part of development. 2 "
In addition, many heterosexual adults also have some homosexual
inclinations.212 Sexual orientation, however, goes beyond simple dispo-
2°2 Watkins, 875 F.2d at 719 (Norris, J., concurring).
205 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (196'2).
2°4 Id. at 667.
205 Id. at 660,
206 Id. at 66(3.
207 1d. at 667.
2" Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
2" See John C. Gonsiorek & Jarnes D. Weinrich, The Definition and Scope of Sexual Orientation,
in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY I, 1 (JOIIII C. Gonsiorek &
James D. Weinrich eds., 1991).
210 DJ. WEST', HostosExuAt.rry RE-ExAtittrrn I (1977).
21I
2121d.
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sitions and inclinations. 213 It is a fundamental part of personal identity,
which has "a pervasive and profound impact on" one's "self-percep-
tion, group affiliation, and identification by others."214 Homosexuality
is thus a major part of one's personhood. 215 A precise definition of
homosexuality is not necessary for the purposes of this Note, however,
as Colorado's Amendment 2, by its very nature, can only apply to
openly homosexual persons and those publicly believed to be homo-
sexual.216
There is much disagreement over the causes of homosexuality. 217
Some experts say that it is acquired psychologically, through experi-
ences:218 Some of these experts believe that it is acquired through
family socialization. 219 Supporters of this view point to the fact that male
homosexuals tend to have dominating mothers and weak father
figures.22° Others believe that homosexuality is acquired by early erotic
experiences with the same gender. 22 '
Other experts assert that homosexuality is caused, at least partially,
by biological factors. 222 Recent research supports this theory. 2" Re-
searchers have found that hormonal responses in homosexual males
are different from those in heterosexual males."' A recent study meas-
ured luteinizing hormone, a substance produced in the human brain
that responds to injections of estrogen. 225 In women, the level drops
slightly and then rises sharply upon injection. 226 The response in men
is not as dramatic.227 Researchers have found that when homosexual
213 See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation.. Homosexuality as a Suspect Clas-
sification, 98 HARV. L. Rix, 1285,1304-05 (1985).
214 Id. at 1303-04.
213 M at 1305.
216 See supra note 2 for the text of Amendment 2.
217 Randolph Blake, Neurohorrnones and Sexual Preference, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1985, at 12.
218
219 WEST, supra note 210, at 86,94.
220 Id, at 86.
221 See LON G. NUNGESSER, HOMOSEXUAL ACTS, ACTORS, AND IDENTITIES 24 (1983).
222 See, e.g.. Richard Green, The Immutability of (Homo)sexual Orientation: Behavioral Science
Implications for a Constitutional (Legal) Analysis, J. PSYCHIATRY & L, 537,568-69 (1988); Simon
LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCI.
1034,1034-35 (1991); J. Silberner, Hormone Markers for Homosexuality?, Sci. NEws, Sep. 29,1984,
at 198.
223 See, e.g., Green, supra note 222, at 568-69 (data points to some contribution of genetics
or hormones to homosexuality); LeVay, supra note 222, at 1034-35 (difference in structure of
part of brain found in homosexual men); Silberner, supra note 222, at 198 (homosexuals
demonstrate a difference in biological response to sex hormone).
224 Silberner, supra note 219, at 198.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
December 1993]
	
AMENDMENT 2 	 243
men are injected, their response is in between that of women and that
of heterosexual men. 228
More dramatic is a recent study that found a difference in the
brain structure of homosexual, compared to heterosexual men. 22' This
study found that a cell group in an area of the brain that participates
in the regulation of male-typical sexual behavior was especially small
in homosexual men. 230 The study found that in homosexual men this
area was about half the size of that in heterosexual men and about the
same size as that in women."' The researcher, however, warned that
the study does not conclusively show if this difference in size is a cause
or result of sexual orientation, or if they are both the result of a third
factor."2 This study is supported by another recent study that found
another difference in this area of the brain in homosexual men. 2"
Other evidence also supports a biological element of homosexual
causality."' For example, homosexual behavior has been observed in
many animals. 235 Implicit in such observations is the conclusion that
homosexuality cannot be solely the result of human social factors. 236
Additionally, studies of twins lend support to the existence of a biologi-
cal correlation.237 Most experts who support the existence of a biologi-
cal factor, however, do not rule out psychological ones as well.238
Although some experts believe that people can change their sex-
ual orientation, most believe that sexual orientation is essentially un-
changeable."' They believe that sexual orientation is set at birth, or at
least at an early age, and cannot be changed except in rare circum-
stances."' A biological root of homosexuality, if proven, would clearly
228 Id.
229 See LeVay, supra note 222, at 1034.
230 Id.
231 Id.
Id. at 1036.
233 Denise Grady, The Brains of Gay Men, DISCOVER, Jan. 1992, at 29,
234 See John A. W. Kirsch & .james D. Weinrich, Homosexuality, Nature, and Biology: Is Honw-
sexuality Natural? Does It Matter?, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY 13,14-15 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991); Green, supra note 222,
at 542.
235 Kirsch & Weinrich, supra note 234, at 14-15 (homosexual behavior observed in bulls,
cows, stallions, donkeys, cats, rams, goats, pigs, antelope, elephants, hyenas, monkeys, apes,
rabbits, lions, porcupines, hamsters, mice and porpoises).
236 see id.
237 See Green, supra note 222, at 542.
738 See West, supra note 210, at 65,
230 See Rivera, supra note 179, al 84; see also Chandler Burr, Homosexuality & Biology, ATLAN-
TIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1993, at 65 ("Wive decades of psychiatric evidence demonstrates that
homosexuality is immutable"),
24° See id. But see NUNGESSER, supra note 221, at 22 ("[p] reference in sexual behaviors and
partners may change over a person's lifetime").
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support such immutability. This position is also supported by those
believing that homosexuality is acquired."' There is no anomaly in this
theory, as learned phenomena, especially those learned at an early age,
can be extremely resistant to change."' The permanence of homosexu-
ality is also supported by the poor results of attempted "treatments."245
Even where it is possible for a homosexual to adopt apparently hetero-
sexual behavior, the trait is still essentially unchangeable due to the
arduousness and painfulness of this process. 244
B. Homosexuals and Society
As subjects of prejudice, discrimination and public disapproval,
homosexuals are a discrete and insular minority."' As Judge Norris of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said, "the
discrimination faced by homosexuals is plainly no less pernicious or
intense than the discrimination faced by other groups already treated
as suspect classes, such as aliens or people of a particular national
origin."4" Throughout history, homosexuals have suffered both public
and private discrimination. 247 Various religions have condemned ho-
mosexuality as a sin and psychiatry has labeled it a mental illness."'
Homosexuals suffer from stigmatization in all spheres of life and re-
ceive a high degree of contempt from society at large.?" The public
censure of homosexuals is seen in varying degrees and forms, ranging
from the common use of words denouncing homosexuality to express
general contempt, to the disparate treatment of homosexuals in many
spheres of life, to unprovoked violence against them."' The govern-
ment supports such discrimination by failing to protect homosexuals
from the bigoted actions of others and by denying them a fair chance
241 See Green, supra note 222, at 568-69.
242 Id. at 565.
243 See Charles Silverstein, Psychological and Medical Treatments of Homosexuality, in Homo-
SEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 101, 1 1 0-1 1 (John C. Gonsiorek & James
D. Weinrich eds., 1991).
244 See Green, supra note 222, at 569.
245 TuntE, supra note 167, at 1616.
246 Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th Cir. 1989) (en Banc) (Norris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
247 See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th
Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990); Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724 (Norris, J., concurring).
248 Green, supra note 222, at 538.
249 Note, supra note 213, at 1285, 1302.
25() Id. at 1285 n.3.
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at a job, service in the armed forces, and the status of formally recog-
nized committed relationships. 25 '
Systematic discrimination against homosexuals has been particu-
larly evident in housing and employment. 252
 Even more striking is the
common violence against homosexuals for no other reason than their
sexual orientation.253
 Such violence is becoming more and more com-
mon in the 1990s.254
 In a poll of lesbians and gay men, five percent of
the men and ten percent of the women reported being physically
abused or assaulted due to their sexual orientation in the prior year. 255
In the same survey, forty-seven percent of the respondents reported
experiencing some form of discrimination during their lives on this
basis. 256
 Indeed, the wave of anti-gay hate crimes that swept Colorado
after the passage of Amendment 2 demonstrates the existence of wide-
spread discriminatory violence against homosexuals. 257
This public sentiment against homosexuals is reflected in widely-
held, but inaccurate, stereotypes. 258
 One such stereotype is that homo-
25I See Rivera, supra note 179, at 232. For a discussion of the current debate over the ben on
gays in the military, see supra notes 291-98 and accompanying text.
252 See Hearing on Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 1454 Before the
Subcomm, on Employment Opportunities af the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess, 23 (1982) (prepared statement by Rep. Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts) (study by the
National Institute of Mental Health showed that sixteen percent of all gay people in the United
Slates have employment problems because of their sexual orientation); see also, e.g., Ben
-Shalom,
881 F.2d at 466 (homosexual tendencies upheld as grounds for discharge from U.S. Army).
253 See Watkins, 875 E2d at 724 (Norris, J., concurring); see also William Paul, Minority Status
for Gay People: Majority Reaction and Social Context, in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 35], 359-61 (William Paul et. al., eds., 1982).
254 Bob Dart, Gay Rights Movement Ls Marching Ahead, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 26, 1993,
at A4.
255 Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in
HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS IOR PUBLIC POLICY 60, 61 (John C. Gonsiorek &
James D. Weinrich eds., 1991).
256 Id.
257 See Knickerbocker, supra note 13, at 1 (Klanwatch reports that recent gay-rights ballot
initiatives and the controversy over homosexuals in the military corresponds to an increase in
the number of attacks on homosexuals); Honor the Boycott of Colorado, STAR TRIB., Feb. 1, 1993,
at 8A (upturn of violence against homosexuals one result of the passage of Amendment 2); Paul
McEnroe, Violence Is Apparent Fallout of Colorado Law on Gays, STAR Tuns., Jan. 25, 1993, at IA
("[It]atred appears to have been unleashed by" Amendment 2); Tony Freeman de, The Hate Slate
Label Dividing Colorado, Hons. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1993, at Al (gay-rights groups report a sharp
rise in hate crimes against homosexuals as well as those who opposed Amendment 2); Mark
Shaffer, Colorado Grapples With Fallout From Anti
-Gay Ordinance, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 3, 1993, at
Al 6 (Sue Anderson, executive director of Denver's Gay and Lesbian Community Center, said that
hate crimes against gays reached 45 in the month Amendment 2 was passed, three times as many
as the 1991 monthly average).
258 See John Balzar, Why Does America Fear Gays?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at Al (cruel
phobias against homosexuals such as regarding gay men as "obsessive predators with their eyes
on America's children" and lesbians as "and-social battle-axes"); Miller, supra note 47, at 822-23
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sexuals try to convert children to homosexuality. 259 This stereotype is
unfounded, both in the belief that homosexuals do this and in the
belief that such behavior can be successful. 26° Other unfounded stereo-
types are that homosexuals are more likely to be child molesters than
heterosexuals and that homosexuality is a mental disease. 26' Such
stereotypes are merely the result of widespread prejudice against and
misunderstanding of homosexuals. 262
Public opinion polls about homosexuals and homosexual rights
evidence this prejudice. 2" 3 A recent poll reported that fifty-three per-
cent of the population does not consider homosexuality to be "accept-
able" behavior. 264 In fact, this poll found that forty-five percent of the
population believe that gay rights are a threat to the American family
and its values. 265 The same poll reported that only about a third of the
respondents said they believe that homosexuals should be allowed to
marry or adopt.266 At the end of the 1980s, although nearly sixty
percent of Americans believed that homosexual acts should be legal,
eighty percent believed that homosexuality is wrong. 267
Surveys of employment opportunities for homosexuals also dem-
onstrate the public sentiment about homosexuals and their place in
society. 268 One poll found that seventy-eight percent of the population
believe that gay men and women should have the same access to job
opportunities as heterosexuals, leaving more than one in five people
believing that homosexuals do not deserve the same job opportunities
as others.269 Another poll shows that people are even less accepting of
homosexuals in the workplace when asked about personally working
with them.27° This poll found that twenty-five percent of respondents
(homosexuals often viewed as child molesters or mentally ill); see also Acanfora v. Board of Educ.,
359 F. Supp. 843, 847-49 (D. Md. 1973) (school board concern over gay teacher's influence on
students), affd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
259 See, e.g., Balzar, supra note 258, at Al; Acanfara, 359 F. Supp. at 847-49.
269 Colman McCarthy, Gay Rights and Gay Acceptance, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1982, § 1, at A19
(no evidence that homosexuals are "compulsive recruiters to their orientation").
261 See Miller, supra note 47, at 822-23; see also Bounlier v INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120, 125 (1967)
(holding that homosexual aliens could be excluded from the United States as having psycho-
pathic personalities).
262 See Miller, supra note 47, at 823-24.
263 See Bill Turqe, Gays Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 35, 36-37; Deborah Scrog-
gins, The Gay Community; Impact in Atlanta, A•alsrrA J. 84 CoNsT,June 23, 1991, at A8.
264 See Turqe, supra note 263, at 36.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 See Balzar, supra note 258, at A14.
268 See Turqe, supra note 263, at 36; Herek, supra note 255, at 61; Scroggins, supra note 263,
at A8.
269 See Turqe, supra note 263, at 36.
270 See Herek, supra note 255, at 61.
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to a national survey would strongly object to working around homo-
sexuals and another twenty-seven percent would prefer not to do so."'
Furthermore, two other polls show that a very large portion of the
population does not think that homosexuals should be hired in occu-
pations that involve children or delicate personal matters. 272
Despite the prejudice and discrimination against them, homo-
sexuals are a productive segment of our society. 278 The American Psy-
chiatric Association asserts this fact in a resolution stating that homo-
sexuality "implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability or
general social or vocational capabilities."274
 In fact, according to a
broadly-based market survey, homosexuals appear to contribute more
to society than do others, as reflected by their income, education,
employment and political participation. 275
 The survey reveals that ho-
mosexuals' average household income is markedly higher than that of
all U.S. households,276
 homosexuals are more than twice as likely as the
average American to hold a college degree,277
 homosexuals are more
likely to hold professional and managerial jobs than the average Ameri-
can, 278
 and per capita, more homosexuals participated in the 1988
presidential election than did Americans at large. 279
Despite this high level of political participation, the power of
homosexuals in our government is not entirely clear.280
 Some courts
271 m .
272 See Turqe, supra note 263, at 346; Scroggins, supra note 263, at A8. The surveys asked
whether homosexuals should he hired in each of the following categories (numbers are percent
saying yes). The results of one survey were: salesperson - 83%; member of the President's cabinet
- 64%; member of armed forces - 59%; doctor - 59%; high school teacher - 54%; elementary
school teachers - 51%; clergy - 48%. Turqe, supra note 263, at 36. The results of the other survey,
which was only conducted in Atlanta, were; salesperson - 87%; military - 64%; doctor - 56%; high
school teacher - 52%; clergy - 50%; elementary school teacher - 45%. Scroggins, supra note 263,
at A8.
273
 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 578 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, January 1975); Ramon
G. McLeod, Gay Market a Potential Gold Mine, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 1991, at Al.
274
 High Tech Gays, 895 E2d at 578 (citing RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, January 1975).
275 See McLeod, supra note '273, at Al,
276 See id. The survey reported an average gay male household income of $51,325 and an
average gay female household income of $45,927, as compared with an overall U.S. household
income of $36,520. Id.
277 Id. The survey found that 62% of gay males and 59% of gay females have college degrees,
while only 24% of all males and only 17% of all females have one. Id.
278 Id. The survey reported that 47% of gay males and 40% of gay females had professional
or managerial jobs, as compared with 31% for all males and 25% for all females. Id.
279 Id. The survey reported that 87% of gay men and 82% of gay women voted, while only
56% of all men and 58% of all women did. Id.
28()
 Compare High Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 378 (Canby, J., dissenting) (homosexuals do not have
significant political power) with Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (homo-
248	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:221
and commentators assert that politics, prejudice and ignorance ensure
that gays will not receive legislative or executive aid sufficient to over-
come discrimination against them. 28' Amendment 2 and the more than
a dozen similar measures being proposed across the nation are them-
selves strong evidence of the political forces against homosexuals. 282
Others argue that gays are not without political power. 2" The one
hundred and forty congressional sponsors to a proposed amendment
to the Civil Rights Act that would include homosexuals evidence ho-
mosexuals' political influence. 284 This amendment, however, is not
likely to be passed anytime soon. 285 Also reflecting homosexuals' politi-
cal influence is the growing number of homosexuals in government. 286
To date, American voters have elected at least seventy-five open homo-
sexuals into local, state and federal offices. 281 Indeed, the political
participation and economic power of the homosexual community, and
the scores of gay-rights ordinances in place across the country, support
the argument that homosexuals have substantial political power. 288
Supporters of this view point to the growing strength of homosexuals
in the Democratic Party, noting President Clinton's support of gay
rights in such issues as the ban on homosexuals in the military and the
ban on travelers with AIDS, as well as his appointment of a lesbian and
gay-rights activist—Roberta Achtenberg—as the assistant secretary for
fair housing and equal opportunity in the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. 289 On the other hand, despite his strong support,
President Clinton has not been able to lift the military's ban on homo-
sexuals or the ban on travelers with AIDS."°
sexuals have significant political power), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); see also Green, supra
note 222, at 538-39 (homosexuals do not have significant political power); Miller, supra note 47,
at 825-26 (same).
281 See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 378; Green, supra note 222, at 538-39; Miller, supra
note 47, at 825-26.
282 See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Amendment 2 and the
proposal of similar measures.
283 See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466.
284 See Knickerbocker, supra note 13, at 4.
285 See Keen, supra note 13, at C3 ("amendment doesn't stand a chance in Congress, at least
not this year").
286 See Dart, supra note 254, at A4.
287 Id,
288 See id. (over 130 states, counties and cities have enacted laws protecting homosexuals
against discrimination); In Colorado, A Correa Decision, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19,1993, at B6 (7 states
and over 100 local governments now have gay rights laws). See supra notes 274-79 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of homosexuals' economic power and political participation.
289 See Kevin Phillips, Gay Clout, Political Dynamite, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,1993, at C1, C3;
Knickerbocker, supra note 13, at 1.
2811 Major Garrett, Party 's Centrists to Hold Applause, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21,1993, at Al (Senate
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The weak political position of homosexuals in our society is re-
flected by the current debate over allowing them into the military.
Originally, President Clinton had said that he would lift the mili-
tary's prohibition of homosexuals."' However, after opposition from
the military and Congress, he compromised with a "don't ask, don't
tell" policy.' 2 Under this policy, the military will no longer inquire into
recruits' or service members' sexual orientation, but will be able to
discharge homosexuals on that basis. 293 The language of this final
compromise denigrates homosexuality by calling it an "unacceptable
risk."2" This policy appears to have the full weight of both the executive
and legislative branches of the federal government behind it. It was
passed by an overwhelming majority in both the House and the Sen-
ate. 295 When the policy was temporarily enjoined from going into effect
by a federal court, 296 the Clinton Administration appealed the injunc-
tion all the way to the Supreme Court. 297 Due to the Supreme Court's
emergency reversal of the preliminary injunction, the policy will be in
effect, at least until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rules on the
matter after a full hearing."
IV. HOMOSEXUALS SHOULD BE DEEMED A SUSPECT CLASS
DESERVING STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
whether homosexuals are a suspect class deserving strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause.'" Lower courts and commentators are
votes 76-23 to ban travelers with AIDS); Paul Quinn-Judge, Rep. Frank Speaks On Gay Service Ban:
The Clinton Agenda, BOSTON Cr.oitt;, Feb. 19, 1993, at 7 (congressional opposition to lifting
military's ban on gays).
291joan Biskupic, Administration Divided On Gays - Military Strategy; Pentagon Wants To Seek
Emergency Stay Of Ruling, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1993, at A2.
252 Id.
2" Id.; Clifford Krauss, With Caveat, House Approves Gay-Troops Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept, 29,
1993, at A15.
29.1
2"Id. (passed by House by a vote of 301 to 134); Helen Dewar, Senate Codifies Policy On Gays
In The Military, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1993, at Al 8 (passed by Senate by a vote of 63 to 33).
299 Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 808 E Stipp, 1453, 1455 (Ca Cal. 1992), stay denied,
61 Empl. Prat, Dec. (CCH) 42197 (9th Cir, 1993), motion fur stay granted in part, 1993 U.S.
LEXIS 6922 (Oct. 29, 1993) (declaring preliminary injunction because, inter alia, the ban of
homosexuality violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment).
297 1993 U.S. LEXIS 6922 (Oct. 29, 1993); see also Linda Greenhouse, High Court Lets
Pentagon Put Gay Policy Into Effect, N.Y. Timm, Oct. 30, 1993, at 6 (Court unanimously granted
stay of injunction on procedural grounds).
29S id .
219 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir.
1990) (Supreme Court never held homosexual classifications to heightened review); Ben-Shalom
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split on the issue."' This section argues that homosexuals should be
deemed a suspect class deserving strict judicial scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. Part A argues that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick does not affect this determina-
tion."' Part B completes the argument by asserting that classifications
based on homosexuality should receive strict judicial scrutiny because
homosexuality meets all of the criteria for suspect class status. 302
A. Hardwick Is Irrelevant to Equal Protection Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick is not relevant to the
determination of the level of judicial scrutiny courts should apply in
equal protection cases. 303 Hardwick merely held that the due process
right to privacy does not include a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. 304 It did not address the issue of equal protec-
tion.305 Nonetheless, some courts have held that Hardwick precludes
suspect class status for homosexual classifications. 306 These decisions
are faulty because they tie the constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection too closely together. 307 They rely on the argument
that there is an anomaly in being able to criminalize the conduct that
defines a suspect class. 308 Judge Norris, however, in his concurring
opinion to Watkins v. United States Army, demonstrated that there is
no such anomaly."' Judge Norris showed that Hardwick is irrelevant to
equal protection cases due to the different dimensions of the consti-
tutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.si° Thus, it
v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing Hardwick), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990).
"See supra notes 166-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the level of equal
protection review granted to homosexuals.
301 See infra notes 303-16 and accompanying text
302 See infra notes 317-44 and accompanying text
3011 See supra notes 166-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hardwick's relevance
to equal protection scrutiny of homosexual classifications,
"478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986); see also, Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718
(9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J., concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
305 478 U.S. at 196 n.8; see also Watkins, 875 F.2d at 716, 717 (Norris, J., concurring).
"See supra notes 171-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of decisions holding that
Hardwick precludes the application of strict scrutiny equal protection review to laws using clas-
sifications based on homosexuality.
" See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference between
due process and equal protection.
"See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of this anomalous argu-
ment.
"See supra notes 189-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of this opinion.
310 See id.
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is not anomalous to grant homosexuals suspect class status simply
because homosexual sodomy is not protected by the Due Process
Clause.'"
That Hardwick dealt with criminalizing homosexual sodomy, an
act, whereas equal protection addresses homosexuality, a status, also
shows that Hardwick is not relevant to the level of equal protection
scrutiny to be given to homosexual classifications.'" As the Court held
in Robinson v. California, there is a distinction between laws addressing
acts and laws addressing personal status.'" While the former can be
criminalized, the later cannot. 314 It follows that, because Hardwick ad-
dressed a criminal statute, it cannot apply to status. In turn, because
equal protection analysis only deals with status, Hardwick is inapplica-
ble. Padula's assertion that homosexuals, as a group, are defined by
certain sexual acts is simply wrong."' As demonstrated above, the status
of homosexuality involves much more than engaging in "homosexual
conduct."316 Thus, Hardwick is not relevant to the determination of the
appropriate level of equal protection review for classifications based
on homosexuality.
B. Homosexuals Deserve Suspect Class Status
Classifications based on homosexuality should receive strict scru-
tiny from the courts, because homosexuality is central to personal
identity and because homosexuals meet all of the criteria of suspect-
ness. These criteria are: (I) the class is defined by a trait that frequently
bears no relationship to the ability to perform in or contribute to
society; (2) the class has been saddled with unique disabilities because
of prejudice or inaccurate stereotypes; (3) the trait defining the class
is immutable; and (4) the class is a politically powerless minority. 317 As
the following examination reveals, homosexuality meets each of these
criteria.
First, homosexuality bears no relationship to a person's ability to
contribute to society." The American Psychiatric Association set this
311 See id.
312 See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction between
Status and acts.
313 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962).
"See id.
3t5 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
316 See.supra notes 209-44 and accompanying text.
317 See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of suspect-
ness,
"See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of homosexuals' ability
to contribute to society.
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forth, saying that homosexuality implies no impairment in judgment,
stability, reliability or general social or vocational abilities. 319 Further-
more, the fact that homosexuals contribute as much, if not more, to
society than heterosexuals, as reflected by their income, education,
employment and level of political participation, demonstrates their
ability to contribute equally to society. 32°
Second, homosexuals are saddled with unique disabilities because
of both prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes."' They have been sub-
jected to a long history of public and private denigration, condemna-
tion, violence and discrimination.'" Such discrimination is not rare
and isolated, but is widespread throughout society."' As Judge Norris
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said, "the
discrimination faced by homosexuals is no less pernicious or intense
than the discrimination faced by other groups already treated as sus-
pect classes, such as aliens and people of a particular national ori-
g in. "324
Third, homosexuality is an immutable trait. 325 While there is dis-
agreement over the causes of homosexuality, most experts agree that
it is set at an early age and generally cannot be changed. 32° Additionally,
even if it could be changed, homosexuality is still essentially immutable
due to the arduousness and painfulness of changing. 327
Furthermore, even if sexual orientation were alterable without
much difficulty, it would still be immutable for equal protection pur-
poses because it is "so central to a person's identity that it would be
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change
"328 Sexual orientation, like race and sex, is immutable for equal
protection purposes because of its pervasive and profound impact on
personal, as well as group, identity. 32° Thus, even if not completely
319 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 578 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, January 1975).
328 See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the achievements of
homosexuals in these areas.
321 See supra notes 245-71 for a discussion of prejudice against and stereotypes concerning
homosexuals.
9221d.
323 Id.
324 Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
925 See supra notes 217-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causes and immu-
tability of homosexuality.
326 See id.
327 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
328 See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring).
328 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
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unchangeable, homosexuality is immutable for equal protection pur-
poses.
Finally, homosexuals comprise a suspect class because they are
politically powerless.'" Politics, prejudice and ignorance ensure that
homosexuals will not receive sufficient governmental aid to overcome
discrimination against them."' Some courts and commentators assert,
however, that homosexuals have significant political power." 2 They
point to the growing strength of homosexuals in the Democratic Party
and to President Clinton's support for gay rights.'" This, however, is a
limited amount of power when compared with the opposition gays face
at all levels of government. They also point to the large number of
sponsors in Congress for a proposed amendment to the Civil Rights
Act that would include homosexuals. 334 Congress, however, has yet to
pass that amendment."' Although homosexuals are also gaining advo-
cates in government, the several score of homosexuals in govern-
ment office across the country hardly amount to significant repre-
sentation.'" Homosexuals' lack of political power is most clearly
demonstrated by the successful opposition to allowing them to serve
openly in the military."' Despite focused national attention and the
support of President Clinton, the military's ban on homosexuals could
not be removed.'" In fact, the opposition to lifting the ban was so
strong that many of its supporters, including the President of the
United States, had to retreat to a compromise position supporting the
ban.319 Even if the courts ultimately lift the ban, the failed political
struggle to do so clearly demonstrates homosexuals' lack of political
power. Finally, some argue that the scores of gay-rights ordinances in
effect across the country demonstrate the political power of homosexu-
als."° These laws are not dispositive, however, as blacks have many more
laws protecting them, including several constitutional amendments,
and they are a suspect class."'
336 See supra notes 280-98 arid accompanying text for a discussion of the political power of
homosexuals.
331 See supra note 281.
332 See supra notes 283-89 for a discussion of this position.
333 See supra note 289.
334 See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
335 See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra notes 291-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current battle over
allowing homosexuals to serve in the military.
333
359 See supra note 292 and accompanying text,
340 See supra note 288.
341 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir.
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The political powerlessness of homosexuals is underscored by the
enactment of Amendment 2. The amendment, by its very nature, limits
the political strength of homosexuals ' land their supporters. 342 The fact
that Amendment 2 was enacted and can be repealed by a consti-
tutional amendment attests to the fact that homosexuals are politically
powerless in Colorado. As a result of the amendment, for homosexuals
in Colorado, the only avenue for relief from discrimination short of a
constitutional amendment resides in the courts. In short, the political
power of homosexuals is insufficient to protect them in a state where
a majority of the population has voted to change the constitution to
limit their rights.
Because homosexuality meets the characteristics of a "suspect
class," it should be included in the lilt of classifications which receive
strict judicial scrutiny.ms As Judge Canby of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote:
To leave on the books the rule that the government can
discriminate against homosexuals whenever it has a rational
basis to do so, is an invitation to tragedy. Homosexuals are
hated, quite irrationally, for what they are, what they did not
choose to be, and what they cannot easily change. Main-
stream society has mistreated them for centuries. If the equal
protection clause means anything, it should mean that gov-
ernment cannot, on the slightest justifications, join in the
discrimination. 344
Homosexuals clearly need and deserve more protection than the
rational basis test provides. Thus, laws that classify homosexuals
should receive strict scrutiny equal protection review.
V. AMENDMENT 2 Is STATE ACTION, THAT DENIES HOMOSEXUALS
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Amendment 2 is state action that
als and denies them equal protection
Protection Clause is not implicated
discriminates against homosexu-
of the law. Although the Equal
by the government's failure to  
1990) (Canby, j., dissenting) (three constitutional lamendments, major federal civil rights acts
and anti-discriminatory laws in 48 states protect blacks).
342 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of Amendment 2 and its
effects.
343 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of strict
scrutiny to suspect classifications.
844 High Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 382 (Canby, J., dissenting).
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protect against private discrimination, or even by the removal of gov-
ernment protection, Amendment 2 does more than just repeal anti-
discrimination laws.'" At the very least, it encourages private discrimi-
nation, which is itself sufficient state action.'" The amendment has the
effect of a state declaration that discrimination against homosexuals is
permissible. The increase in violence against homosexuals that has
accompanied Amendment 2's enactment evidences its encouragement
of private discrimination.' 47 Such encouragement is enough to impli-
cate the state in the discrimination.'"
Amendment 2, however, goes much further; it embodies the right
to discriminate "in the state's basic charter" and makes discrimination
against homosexuals immune from legislative, executive or judicial
regulations at any level of state government.'" In this way, Amendment
2 is like the laws in Reitman and Hunter, which were found to violate
the Equal Protection Clause, as it makes it harder for a minority group
to redress grievances."° Like the laws in those cases, Amendment 2
repeals laws protecting a group and requires a majority plebiscite vote
to pass new ones."' Thus, it encourages and authorizes discrimination
and makes it harder for homosexuals to redress grievances or fight
unfair treatment than it is for the rest of society. As a result of Amend-
ment 2, homosexuals, unlike every other group of people in Colorado,
cannot petition the government in any of its branches to protect their
interests."" For example, a person can sue an employer for discrimina-
tion against him or her on other grounds, such as race, age or sex, but
cannot bring suit if the discrimination is based on homosexuality. If
Amendment 2 becomes effective, homosexuals' only avenue for official
relief will be a constitutional amendment or the courts. Thus, Amend-
ment 2 is identical in effect to the laws in Hunter and Reitman and
should therefore be invalidated. Furthermore, as in Hunter and Reit-
man, Amendment 2 is no more valid because it was passed by public
referendum.
"5 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of equal protection and
the failure of a state to protect individuals.
346 See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of state encouragement
of discrimination as state action for equal protection purposes.
547 See, supra note 257 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 109-22.
84" Reiunan v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,377 (1967); see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Amendment 2 and its effects.
35° See Hunter v, Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,387 (1969); Reitman, 387 U.S. at 370-71; see supra
notes 135-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hunterand Reitman.
"I See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of Amendment 2 and its
effects.
952 See id.
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Like the laws in Hunter and Reitman, Amendment 2 violates a
group's right to equal protection of the law by discriminating against
them without justification. The analysis in section IV demonstrates that
homosexuals should be deemed a suspect class, and therefore, Amend-
ment 2 should be accorded strict judicial review under the Equal
Protection Clause."' Even if homosexuals are not a suspect class, strict
scrutiny should still be applied as Amendment 2 interferes with the
fundamental right of equal political representation.'" The amendment
effectively reduces homosexuals' ability to seek redress in government
and is therefore analogous to interference with the right to vote."5
Amendment 2 eliminates the assumption on which the rational basis
test rests, that government institutions are structured to fairly represent
the people.'" By making it harder to seek government assistance or
protection, Amendment 2 reduces homosexuals' voice in these institu-
tions and therefore eliminates the grounds for using the deferential
rational basis standard of review. 357 Thus, Amendment 2, like voting
regulations, should receive strict judicial scrutiny. Under such scrutiny,
to survive an equal protection attack, the amendment must be neces-
sary to achieve a compelling state interest.'" As the Supreme Court
held in Hunter and Reitman, limits on a group's political power are not
justifiable by any legitimate state purpose. 959 Thus, Amendment 2 vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause.
In fact, even if homosexuals are not considered a suspect class and
no fundamental right is found, Amendment 2 should still be struck
down, as it cannot withstand an equal protection attack, even under
the deferential rational basis standard of review. Amendment 2 fails to
satisfy this test because it does not serve any legitimate governmental
purpose."° The only objective of Amendment 2 is "a bare . . . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group," which is not a legitimate
governmental purpose."' As the United States Supreme Court said in
353 See supra notes 299-344 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons why
classifications based on homosexuality deserve strict scrutiny.
354 See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict scrutiny of acts
affecting fundamental rights.
355 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of Amendment 2 and its
effects.
Ir'41 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the foundation of the
rational basis test and acts which undermine it.
See id.
358 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
35'J
	 Hunter; 393 U.S. at 393; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 370.
s°1 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rational basis test.
35L City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 452, 446-47 (1985); see also United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973).
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Cleburne, "mere negative attitudes, or fear" are not a sufficient justifica-
tion for the government to discriminate against a class of people. 362
Thus, Amendment 2 cannot be justified, even under the rational basis
test. 363
That many of the cases finding a rational basis for disparate treat-
ment of homosexuals assert a unique situation that requires doing so,
such as the demands of military discipline and morale, evidences the
fact that there is no rational basis for simple discrimination against ho-
mosexuals.N4 Such a unique situation does not exist to justify Amend-
ment 2, as it is a broad provision covering all aspects of state govern-
ment and all homosexuals. 3"' Because Amendment 2 is not justifiable,
even under the rational basis test, the logic of Hunter and Reitman
should apply. Thus, Amendment 2 should be struck down, even if it is
not granted heightened equal protection scrutiny.' 66
VI. CONCLUSION
Amendment 2 should be invalidated because it violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by discriminating
against a class of society for no valid reason. This class, homosexuals,
should be deemed a suspect class deserving strict judicial scrutiny.
Despite the holding of several courts, Bowers v. Hardwick does not apply
to equal protection analysis because it was decided on due process
grounds and addressed an act, not a status. Homosexuals deserve
suspect class status because they satisfy all of its requirements: they are
defined by a trait that frequently bears no relationship to the ability
to perform in or contribute to society, they have been saddled with
unique disabilities because of prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes,
they are defined by a trait which is immutable, and finally, they arc a
politically powerless minority. Furthermore, even if homosexuals do
552 473 U.S. at 448.
963 While the Supreme Court, in Hardwick, has held that morality can be a rational basis for
a law, that decision was based on substantive due process, not equal protection, and is therefore
inapposite to the challenge to Amendment 2. 478 U.S. at 196. See supra notes 193-98 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the different dimensions of due process and equal protec-
tion. Furthermore, Amendment 2 does not promote morality, but rather, simply discriminates
against a class of citizens due to public dislike for them.
364 See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of application of the
rational basis test to disparate treatment of homosexuals and special considerations that justify
such treatment
565 Sec supra note 2 for text of Amendment 2.
56tThe California Court of Appeals reached this conclusion in a recent case involving a city
ordinance similar to Amendment 2. Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 648, 650-51, 655 (Ct. App. 1991).
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not constitute a suspect class, strict scrutiny should still apply because
Amendment 2 infringes upon the fundamental right to equal political
representation.
Amendment 2 is state action that violates the Equal Protection
Clause by discriminating against homosexuals. It does more than just
remove their governmental protections; it encourages discrimination
and embodies the right to discriminate in the state's basic charter. The
amendment makes it harder for homosexuals to receive government
aid or protection than it is for anyone else. Thus, like the laws in Hunter
and Reitman, Amendment 2 should be invalidated. Finally, even if
homosexuals are not found to constitute a suspect class and no funda-
mental right is recognized, Amendment 2 should still be invalidated
because it fails to satisfy the rational basis test. The amendment does
not promote any legitimate governmental purpose, but only promotes
a desire to discriminate against an unpopular group.
The outcome of the challenge to Amendment 2 is of national
importance. Groups in many other states are preparing and promoting
similar measures, and more will surely join in if the courts uphold
Amendment 2. This challenge is all the more important, because gay
rights is becoming a prominent issue of our time. The outcome of this
challenge may well affect gay rights in other realms, such as the mili-
tary's ban on homosexuals. Thus, Amendment 2's final disposition is
of utmost importance not just to Coloradans, but to people in every
state of the union.
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